Monthly Archives: December 2010

After reading John Mearsheimer’s compelling take on U.S. foreign policy, what I noticed was how the U.S. follows a specific track and stays with it despite the consequences.  More importantly, the U.S. since the end of the Cold War has perceived itself as the global police officer.  That means there were two tracks for the U.S. to follow and keep the world in line.  First, it could use selective engagement in conflicts.  Meaning, the U.S. could pre-empt attacks and enemies before they rose.  Essentially, this is the containment doctrine of the Cold War, just repackaged.  Second, the U.S. could purse offshore balancing.  Instead of trying to solve all the world’s problems, the U.S. would pick a country in that region to police it for us.  India and Japan do this in Asia, the U.S. has used Cuba, Haiti, and Panama to watch Latin America.  Iraq, Afghanistan, and Israel could be considered the watchdogs of the U.S.  It is like a neighborhood watch strategy to solve world problems.

Historically, the U.S. has used both doctrines to guide its foreign policy agenda.  Both also have their flaws, but Mearsheimer concludes offshore balancing is probably better.  The next task for Mearsheimer is to pick the motives for U.S. foreign policy.  I have identified two this week, American Exceptionalism and economic interests.  Security is another disguise for American foreign policy.  The pre-emptive attacks on Iraq are great examples of stopping terrorism before it strikes the U.S.  Fair enough, the U.S. wants to attack the problem at its source.  It is similar to the domestic strategy of going into the inner-city and changing their family value system to prevent poverty, missing all the other causes.  This analogy works perfectly with to describe why it is so complicated to go into a country and change its governmental structure.  Instituting a new government is one thing, but getting people to trust it and developing political parties for that system is quite another.

Both of these motives have guided history.  The actions of selective engagement and offshore balancing combined with the motives of American Exceptionalism, economic interests, and security interests provide a framework for looking at foreign policy over the last 10 years.  Most troubling are the motives and our wrong guessing.  No one likes to be wrong, especially nations making foreign policy. Its these methods that anger those we try to conquer.  For instance, why did Al-Qaeda attack the U.S. on 9/11.  The reason given was “they hate us for our freedoms,” not quite.  Specific policies advocated by the U.S. such as supporting Israel, having troops in Saudi Arabia during the first Gulf War, the coup in 1953 to put the Shah in power in Iran, and support for dictators in Egypt and Pakistan sometimes anger people.  These are what anger terrorists, not jealousy.

So, instead of reforming our own foreign policy attitudes we assume erroneously the wrong reason.  The problem is admitting to the people that we were wrong.  That requires redefining our history, not an easy task.  Changing our attitudes about history will be the start to redefining our foreign policy.  If your motives change, so do your strategies and that could help the U.S. in the long-term.

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