Tag Archives: economic policy

Federal Student Loans not Profitable

By John Stang

Reihan Salam at National Review explains why student loans are not profitable for the federal government to start out with:

To see why the government’s cost of borrowing doesn’t capture the full cost of making a student loan, consider an example similar to one that Debbie Lucas at the MIT Sloan School of Management uses. Let’s say the government issues $100 million in 10-year U.S. Treasury notes to finance $100 million in student loans with 10-year repayment terms. Assume that after the 10 years is up, the student loan portfolio has suffered losses such that the U.S. Treasury bonds cannot be fully repaid with the loan repayments alone.

Does the government then default on its debts? Of course not. It taps taxpayers to make up the losses and repays bondholders in full. Note that this makes taxpayers equity investors in the student loan program – it is their money that will be used to absorb 100% of any losses on the loans to ensure U.S. Treasury bond holders are always repaid.

That highlights a key point: the interest rate on U.S. Treasury securities tells us what investors want to be paid to lend with zero risk of default. Federal student loans are not, however, free of default risk. The U.S. Department of Education expects thatabout 19 percent of loans made to students in 2013 will default at some point. Yes, cost estimates can build those default rates in, and Congress can charge an interest rate on student loans that more than fully offset such expected losses. But any unexpected losses, those that might occur if the economy weakens, wouldn’t be covered, placing the default costs squarely on taxpayers.

For a solution, Mike Konczal advocates for a public option for public universities:

Beyond ensuring equality of opportunity, another advantage of this approach is that it would help stop cost inflation. Free public universities would function like the proposed “public option” of healthcare reform. If increased demand for higher education is causing cost inflation, then spending money to reduce tuition at public universities will reduce tuition at private universities by causing them to hold down tuition to compete. This public option would reduce informational problems by creating a baseline of quality that new institutions have to compete with, allowing for a smoother transition to new competitors. And it allows for democratic control over one of the basic elements of human existence—how we gather information and share it among ourselves.

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Ideological Politics and Urban Housing

By John Stang

Matt Yglesias writes in his new book The Rent is Too Damn High about how to make urban housing cheaper and its impact on the economy.  He notes how right and left politics get in the way of this and how both can offer solutions in different ways:

That’s why housing is so expensive in the major coastal metropolises and also in the core downtown areas of lower-cost midwestern cities. The appropriate policy response is to stop disparaging apartment buildings as tenements and stop preventing developers from building them. People should by no means be “forced” to stop owning and driving cars, but there’s no reason for regulations to incentivize these activities. Progressives and urbanists need to move beyond their romance with central planning and get over their distaste for business and developers. Conservatives need to take their own ideas about economics more seriously and stop seeing all proposals for change through a lens of paranoia and resentment. Lastly, politicians of both parties who like to complain about “regulation” and “red tape” ought to spend some time looking at the specific area of the economy where red tape and regulation are most prevalent.

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Filed under economic policy, housing

It Matters Where Jobs Were Added

By John Stang

Derek Thompson at the Atlantic notes how Friday’s jobs report is encouraging because of where jobs are being added:

One way to drill down into this question is to reflect on the really big picture: Where the jobs are going and where aren’t they going. Since Obama’s first month on the job, total government has lost 600,000 jobs. (He’s a pretty bad socialist, apparently.) The goods-producing sector, which includes manufacturing and construction, is still down 1.6 million jobs — as many jobs as we added all of last year! All the growth has been in services, where we’ve added 1.3 million new positions.

Here’s what the January 2009 – February 2012 change looks like as a share of total jobs in government, goods, and services. If you break out services by education, you would find evidence that people with college and advanced degrees were both less likely to lose their jobs in the recession and more likely to find higher-paying positions in the recovery.

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The “Ecosocpolitical” Sphere

By John Stang

When trying to cut the deficit in some way, that obviously requires trying to change some form of entrenched social policy for which a constituency exists.  In Europe and the U.S., this is the case.  Matt Yglesias writes about Europe:

Whether you agree with Kierkegaard about that or not, this once again highlights thecentral dilmma of the “independent” central bank. Kierkegaard is a writer and a policy analyst. He pushes for labor market reforms by trying to convince people that they’re a good idea. Thorning-Schmidt is a politician, she pushes for labor market reforms (or not) by campaigning and winning elections and securing votes in parliament. But Draghi is a central banker. His job is supposed to be to provide macroeconomic stability—low unemployment and non-accelerating inflation. But he’s got views on these matters every bit as much as Thorning-Schmidt or Kierkegaard or myself. But he actually has the power to make Kierkegaard’s version of the old saw about the Chinese characters for danger and opportunity into a reality. By tweaking the speed and alacrity with which he responds to short-term demand-side growth issues, he can mightily influence the course of long-term structural policymaking. Elected officials in Italy and Spain don’t have the tools to stabilize the Spanish and Italian macroeconomies over the short term. But they do have the tools to implement long-term structural reforms that Draghi either likes or dislikes, and Draghi has the power to dispense short-term stabilization in accordance with his estimation of the merit of Spanish and Italian long-term policies. In effect, he and his colleagues are running the whole show while simultaneously being accountable to almost nobody.

To put it simply, whether on a central banking or political level, someone will make a decision that impacts a social situation of someone else, which is how economic policy operates.  Except, central bankers can have an impact on interest rates while politicians can control social policy, such as labor reforms.  Both are critical, but the latter takes more staying power than the other because the latter is accountable to a voting public.  On the American side, David Brooks discusses the tax code and its implications for social policy:

The U.S. does not have a significantly smaller welfare state than the European nations. We’re just better at hiding it. The Europeans provide welfare provisions through direct government payments. We do it through the back door via tax breaks. For example, in Europe, governments offer health care directly. In the U.S., we give employers a gigantic tax exemption to do the same thing. European governments offer public childcare. In the U.S., we have child tax credits. In Europe, governments subsidize favored industries. We do the same thing by providing special tax deductions and exemptions for everybody from ethanol producers to Nascar track owners.

By trying to change the tax code, or simplifying it, by eliminating loopcauses and carve-outs, that offsets specific incentives for people to have children, buy a house, or even purchase economic necessities for the good of the country, like green technology.  Not to say trading it for a welfare state wouldn’t be a bad thing, but the perception of eliminating some sort of tax credit does have a small psychological affect.

The point is that economic policy, an obvious point, is complicated because every choice not only has an economic consequence, but also changes a human behavior and sways public opinion.  Think of it as one “ecosocpolitical” sphere.  That’s why the tax code can’t be simplified so easily or we are not on our way to a single payer health care system.

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In Politics, Is Money the Root of All Evil?

By Luke Brinker

Veteran political journalist Elizabeth Drew’s essay on the rise of super PACs and their impact on the 2012 campaign concludes on an ominous note:

Citizens are now faced with evidence of the growing power of organized moneyed interests in the electoral system at the same time that the nation is more aware than ever that the inequality among income groups has grown dramatically and economic difficulties are persistent. This is a dangerous brew. Political power is shifting to the very monied interests that four decades of reform effort have tried to contain. The election system is being reshaped by the Super PACs and the greatly increased power of those who contribute to them to choose the candidates who best suit their purposes. But little attention is being paid to the fact that our system of electing a president is under siege. While the political press is excitedly telling us how the polls on Friday compare with the ones on Tuesday, little notice is taken of the danger to the democratic system itself.

Much of the citizenry has become more restive—less accepting of the way things are. Can an election that’s being subjected to such seriously self-interested contortions be accepted by the public as having been arrived at in a fair manner? And what will happen if it can’t?

All of these are valid points. Indeed, empirical evidence buttresses Drew’s concern that in this age of money-soaked politics, the voices of the 99 percent are drowned out. In a recent paper, Princeton University political scientist Martin Gillens found that the policy preferences of the rich are most salient among policymakers. (Although, as Matthew Yglesias argued, this may be attributable to socialization; presidents and members of Congress tend to go to the same schools and live in the same neighborhoods as the elite.) The question, then, is whether money itself produces policy outcomes that ignore vital issues of income inequality and basic fairness.

As Drew notes in her piece, the recent history of campaign finance reform began in the wake of the Watergate scandal. Congress passed a law in 1974 establishing public financing for presidential campaigns and limiting both the amount of money individuals could give to campaigns and the amount congressional campaigns could spend. The Supreme Court upheld the law in its 1976 Buckley v. Valeo decision.

Somewhat paradoxically, the pre-Buckley era was the Augustan Age for American egalitarianism. In his book Supercapitalism, economist Robert Reich writes that “[i]n 1963, Congress passed six out of ten bills designed to reduce economic inequality. In 1979, it passed four out of seven … [and] in 1991, two out of seven” (p. 166). In other words, policymakers did more to address the concerns of the lower, working, and middle classes back when rich donors could give unlimited amounts of money directly to campaigns.

What distinguishes 1963 from 1991 or 2012 is that American labor has witnessed its power diminish significantly since mid-century. While public sector employees remain relatively strongly unionized (37 percent belonged to a union in 2011, according to the Bureau of Labor Statistics), the unionization rate among private sector workers was a mere 6.9 percent. In 2010, the overall unionization rate (including public and private sector workers) was 12.3 percent. Contrast that with the mid-1950s, when 35 percent of American workers belonged to a labor union. This was the context in which John Kenneth Galbraith wrote American Capitalism, in which the Harvard economist introduced the concept of “countervailing power.” In the American system, Galbraith wrote, the trifecta of big business, big labor, and big government worked both to plan the national economy and to counter-balance each other, so that no one force became too overweening in its grip on the nation. Fast forward to 2012, and there is no “big labor” of which to speak. Defenders of super PACs invariably respond to liberal critiques of corporate money in politics by pointing out, correctly, that unions are also permitted unlimited donations to super PACs. But to pretend that unions have anywhere near the clout of American corporations is disingenuous.

Part of labor’s decline can be explained by the forces of globalization; in a global economy with cheap Chinese labor readily available, unions pushing for increased wages and benefits have less bargaining power. These global economic realities simply did not exist at mid-century. Yet conscious political choices have also played an essential role in weakening unions. Take Wisconsin Gov. Scott Walker’s move last year to strip state employees of their collective bargaining rights. Take Ohio Gov. John Kasich’s (voter-overturned) decision to do the same. Take Gov. Mitch Daniels’s signing of Indiana’s new right to work law, which effectively means that employees can free-ride on unions, benefiting from the concessions and benefits that union leaders win but not having to pay membership dues. These policies emerge thanks to political actors, not impersonal economic forces.

There’s much to be said for reining in money in politics. When Sheldon Adelson and his wife can keep Newt Gingrich’s presidential campaign alive simply by writing a $10 million check to a  Gingrich super PAC, it is not unreasonable to worry about the decline of citizen power in our democracy. But elections are about who gets to make policy, and if policies that reduce inequality and pursue greater fairness are what we care about, we could do a lot worse than to realize that money itself is not the root of our present woes.

Update: As Steven Greenhouse of the New York Times reports, the BLS has just released unionization figures for 2011, and the decline continues. Last year, the overall unionization rate was 11.8 percent.

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Filed under 2012 Election, campaign finance